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THURBERT BAKER BEHAVING BADLY
Published in slightly abridged form in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, p. 3B (June 17, 2007).

Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.

Genarlow Wilson’s 10-year sentence and continued imprisonment is widely
recognized, both in this state and across the country, as a grave miscarriage of
justice. Last Monday, June 11, 2007, the Monroe County Superior Court determined
that Wilson’s punishment violated the state constitution and granted his habeas corpus
petition, resentencing Wilson to 12 months and ordering his immediate release. The
decision was applauded everywhere. The decent thing for Attorney General Thurbert
Baker to do would have been to leave the decision undisturbed and allow Wilson to
go free. Instead, he appealed.
Baker says only the Douglas County Superior Court, where Wilson was convicted,
has authority to resentence Wilson. Baker is flat wrong. Habeas courts have always
possessed broad, flexible powers to fashion appropriate relief. The usual practice,
when it invalidates a sentence, is for the habeas court to remand the petitioner to the
convicting court for resentencing, but there is no Georgia statute prohibiting a habeas
court from itself conducting the resentencing. The relevant law, Ga. Code Ann. § 914-48(d), codifies traditional practices by expansively providing that a habeas court
granting relief “shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or
sentence challenged in the proceeding, and such supplementary orders as to
rearraignment, retrial, custody, or discharge as may be necessary and proper.” There
is not a single Georgia Supreme Court decision interpreting this statute to forbid
habeas courts from resentencing successful petitioners. O’Donnell v. Durham, 275
Ga. 860, 573 S.E.2d 23 (2002), which Baker claims bars habeas courts from
resentencing petitioners, says no such thing.
Baker’s responsibility to follow the laws as they are written in no way compelled him
to appeal. Baker was not legally required to appeal, even if he thought the habeas
decision was erroneous; nor did he have an ethical duty to appeal. Whether to take
the appeal was entirely a matter of prosecutorial discretion, and occasionally
prosecutors do decline appealing habeas decisions in favor of prisoners. Considering
all the circumstances, it is strange that Baker does not find Wilson’s habeas victory an

appropriate occasion for exercising his discretion to decline to appeal–a discretion
which also permits him to withdraw his appeal whenever he wishes. Nothing could
be further from the truth than Baker’s claim that he doesn’t have the luxury of picking
which cases to defend–or, in this case, to appeal. Of course he does.
Baker’s “floodgates” argument is that failing to appeal in the Wilson case would open
the door to other habeas petitioners claiming they are entitled to relief because Wilson
prevailed. But the Wilson habeas decision has absolutely no potential for affecting
the sentences of any significant number of convicted felons. There are at most around
25 other state prison inmates in a situation even arguably similar to Wilson’s. And a
discretionary decision not to appeal in Wilson’s case would be irrelevant in the
context of habeas petitions filed by inmates other than Wilson; this is what discretion
means.
Even if Baker is right that the habeas court’s decision was mistaken, what harm would
have resulted from failing to appeal that decision? All that would have happened is
that amidst widespread rejoicing Genarlow Wilson would have left prison, and there
would be left intact a court decision with little precedential value–an unreported,
unappealed trial court judgment releasing the prisoner in a nationally known case
involving a black youth incarcerated in a gross miscarriage of justice. Nor would a
discretionary decision by Baker not to appeal obligate him to forego other appeals or
impair his ability to represent the state in other habeas proceedings.
Instead of acting to correct a gross injustice, Thurbert Baker has aggravated it. Why
is Thurbert Baker behaving so badly?

